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Dismissal of Permanent Teachers
Unlike dismissal procedures commonly known to civil service systems, teachers
with tenure may demand a judicial hearing in the superior court before being
dismissed. This distinction was alluded to in Board of Education v. Ballou' where
the court said:
The legislature has placed upon the judges the duty of determining whether
a teacher should be dismissed when charges such as incompetency are filed. A
duty essentially administrative has been withdrawn from administrative
officials and imposed upon officials exercising judicial functions. It is to be
hoped that the legislature will not be prevailed upon to extend this duty so
that the courts will be compelled to pass upon all of the charges that may be
filed against 2 civil service employees of the state and its various political
subdivisions.
This decision was rendered shortly after the enactment of Chapter 657 of the
Statutes of 1931 which preceded the present provisions concerning the dismissal
8
of permanent teachers.
Briefly, the present dismissal procedure requires the filing of written charges
with the governing board of the school district or, in the alternative, the preparation of charges formulated by the board alleging one or more of the statutory
causes for the dismissal of the permanent teacher. After charges have been filed,
the board may notify the teacher of its intention to dismiss him at the expiration of
thirty days, unless the teacher demands a hearing. 4 If no hearing is demanded the
employee may be dismissed at the expiration of thirty days. 5 However, if a hearing
is demanded, the board then has the option of rescinding its action or proceeding
with the dismissal by filing a complaint in the superior court. This must be done
within thirty days after the teacher's demand for a hearing "setting forth the
charges . . . and asking that the court inquire into the charges and determine

whether or not the charges are true, and if true, whether or not they constitute
sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the employee."6
Provision is also made for the immediate suspension of a permanent employee
charged with the commission of specific offenses such as immoral conduct or
incompetency due to mental disability. 7 Thus, whenever a permanent teacher is
charged with the commission of a sex offense by complaint, information or indictment, the board must immediately place the employee on compulsory leave of
8
absence pending judgment in the proceedings.
INCOMPETENCY

In any proceedings looking toward the dismissal of a permanent teacher,
special attention should be given to the provisions of section 13407 of the Educa'21 Cal.App.2d 52, 68 P.2d 389 (1937).
'Id. at 55, 68 P.2d at 391.
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tion Code. This section essentially provides that before any action is taken to
dismiss a teacher for "incompetency," at least ninety days notice of the nature
of the incompetency must be given the teacher in order to allow him "an opportunity to correct his faults and overcome his incompetence." This requirement of
notice to enable a teacher to remedy correctible faults or defects within a specified
time prior to the initiation of dismissal proceedings was contained in the original
act by the addition of School Code section 5.652 during the 1931 regular session
of the legislature. 9 This section was amended in 1935 in order to prohibit any
action by governing boards of school districts involving charges of incompetency
"other than incompetency due to physical or mental disability" until after the
teacher had been notified of the nature of the incompetency and given an
opportunity to overcome the same. 10
Thereafter, in Fresno City High School District v. DeCaristo," the governing
board of the Fresno City High School District charged a permanent teacher with,
(1) failing to familiarize herself with the rules and regulations of the board;
(2) failing to preserve order and discipline in the classroom; (3) absenting herself
without consent and refusing to permit a substitute to act after requesting the
appointment of a substitute; (4) committing acts of unprofessional conduct by
initiating disputes with other teachers in the presence of pupils; and (5) evidencing unfitness for service by engaging in fits of temper and rage in and out
of the classroom and by publicly making unwarranted statements. After demand
for a hearing, a complaint was filed in the superior court and judgment was
entered in the trial court authorizing the dismissal. On appeal, the court concluded
that the term "incompetency" as employed in School Code section 5.652, as
amended in 1935, was used "in its broad sense and not in the restricted meaning
employed in section 5.650 [Now Ed. Code section 13403]," and since the school
board had not given the accused the required notice and opportunity to correct
her faults before taking action the prosecution was rendered fatal by reason of
12
this failure.
Following this decision, School Code section 5.652 was again amended at the
next regular session of the legislature. The amendment deleted the words "other
than incompetency due to physical or mental disability" which had been added
by Chapter 691 of the Statutes of 1935, and added the following sentence: "The
term 'incompetency' as used in this section means, and refers only to, the incompetency particularly specified as a cause for dismissal in School Code Section 5.650
and does not include any other cause for dismissal specified in School Code
section 5.650."13
Since section 13407 of the Education Code now reads essentially the same
as the amended School Code section 5.652, it appears that under existing law
notice to remedy correctible faults or defects prior to filing charges is not required
except in instances of "incompetency" in its restricted sense.
Stats. 1931, c. 657.
10 Stats. 1935, c. 691.
" Fresno City High School District v. De Caristo, 33 Cal.App.2d 666, 92 P.2d 668 (1939).
12 Id. at 673, 92 P.2d at 672.
13 Stats. 1941, c. 1041.
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Support for this conclusion may be found in Board of Education v. Weiland
even though the court there made no reference to the legislative history of the
section. 15 Here, the teacher was charged with immoral conduct, unprofessional
conduct, dishonesty and evident unfitness for service. In response to the assertion
that the failure to give notice to remedy rendered the charges defective, the court
stated: "The charges or anything charged in this case did not include incompetency and the section was not applicable."16
As in the cases of Board of Education v. Swan17 and Laguna Beach School
Dist. v. Lewis,' 8 it is not infrequent that a complaint alleging several causes for the
dismissal of a permanent teacher will be met with the argument that each cause
of action should be separately stated in different causes of action. This was also
recognized in the following dissertation: "A complaint that sets forth several
specifications of alleged unprofessional conduct states only one cause of action.
It is not, therefore, subject to demurrer on the ground of improper joining of
19
several causes of action or of failure to state causes separately."
UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The most recent case on the subject of the dismissal of a permanent teacher is
Board of Trustees v. Owens.20 In that case, the teacher caused to be published
in the local newspaper a series of letters which the majority opinion described as

"somewhat intemperate." These letters were made the basis for numerous charges,
including, among other things, unprofessional conduct. The trial court concluded
that the publication of the letters constituted unprofessional conduct and entered
judgment accordingly. On appeal, the court stated generally that trial courts
"enjoy a great deal of discretion" in determining what constitutes unprofessional
conduct, but are "bound by the limits placed by the appellate courts upon the
21
concept of the scope of 'unprofessional conduct'." The court then stated:
Thus, the trial court's primary inquiry in the present case where the sole
basis of the charges were letters critical of education should have been to the
of discipline
questions of whether there had been any disruption or impairment
22
or the teaching process as a result of defendant's letters.
After stating that during the trial the plaintiff seemed to be predisposed to fault
finding and placing the burden of justification on the defendant, the court said
that "The plaintiff might more profitably spend its time in attempting to establish
what effect harmful to education in Lassen County had been engendered by the
letters."28

Therefore, the question arises whether the Owens case is authority for the
proposition that in cases of unprofessional conduct it is necessary for the plaintiff
'4179 Cal.App.2d 808, 813, 4 Cal.Rptr. 286, 289 (1960).
15CAL. En. CODE § 13407.
16 Board of Education v. Weiland, 179 Cal.App.2d 808, 813, 4 Cal.Rptr. 286, 289 (1960).
1141 Cal.2d 546, 261 P.2d 261 (1953).
18 146 Cal.App.2d 463, 304 P.2d 59 (1956).
19 44 CAL. Jun.2d Schools § 514 (1958).
20 206 A.C.A. 162, 23 Cal.Rptr. 710 (1962).
11Id. at 172, 23 Cal.Rptr. at 717.
2 Ibid.
" Id. at 173, 23 Cal.Rptr. at 718.
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to prove that the conduct, which is the basis for the charge, did in some manner
adversely affect the educational program of the employing school district.
In answer to the query, it could be argued that the broad discretion formerly
vested in the school authorities to dismiss a permanent teacher for one of the
enumerated causes 24 is, as stated in the Ballou case, a "duty essentially administrative [which] has been withdrawn from administrative officials and imposed
upon officials exercising judicial functions." 25 More particularly, this discretion
is now vested in the superior court of the county in which the school district is
located. Therefore, in the absence of abuse of discretion, the trial court's decision
in the matter is final. In other words, it could be argued that it was the intention
of the legislature in the enactment of the original 1931 act 26 to substitute the
superior court for the school board in proceedings looking toward the dismissal
of a permanent teacher and, therefore, the trial courts retain the same broad
discretion as was formerly vested in school boards, subject to review only for
abuses of discretion.
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"See Goldsmith v. Board of Education, 66 Cal.App. 157, 172-73, 225 Pac. 783, 789 (1924).
"Board of Education v. Ballou, 21 Cal.App.2d 52, 55, 68 P.2d 389, 391 (1937).
" Stats. 1931, c. 657.

